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Abstract
We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry.
We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks
strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to
enter their market. Disclosure of borrower information increases an entrant’s second-period
profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market.
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Most oligopoly models of barriers to entry impose a temporal asymmetry between ﬁrms.
In the simplest framework, one ﬁrm enjoys an incumbency position while another takes up
the role of the entrant. Prior to potential entry, the incumbent has a monopoly position.
Exogenous factors usually explain the temporal asymmetry. The incumbent entered the
market early, possibly because of its technological lead. This temporal asymmetry allows
the established ﬁrm to accumulate a suﬃcient amount of “capital” in order “to limit the
entry of other ﬁr m so re v e nt om a k et h e i re n t r yu n p r o ﬁtable” (Tirole (1988), p.315). In
this way, the established ﬁrm can optimally take advantage of its incumbency position
by creating barriers to entry limiting or even preventing competition.
The importance of dynamic models of oligopoly related to entry barriers and accom-
modation cannot be overstated. However, often ﬁrms compete for incumbency positions.
As a result, the exogenous temporal asymmetry between incumbent and entrant is ab-
sent. In this paper, we depart from this exogenous asymmetry and focus on the strategic
eﬀects when incumbent and entrant status arises endogenously. In a two-period duopoly
model, we show that an endogenous temporal asymmetry results in incumbent ﬁrms
having an incentive to lower future barriers to entry. By lowering barriers, competition
between ﬁrms for serving the ﬁrst-period market and taking up the role as incumbent
in the second period is seriously reduced. The basic intuition behind this result is that
lowering future entry barriers increases an entrant’s second-period proﬁts. Firms ratio-
nally anticipate that lower future entry barriers generate higher proﬁts from entry. In our
model, proﬁtable entry results from suﬃciently heterogeneous consumer switching costs
and ﬁrms’ ability to price discriminate between old and new customers. Of course, the
incumbent ﬁrm must be able to credibly commit to lower future entry barriers. When
such commitment is possible, overall competition may drastically decrease as a result of
the lower future entry barriers.
We develop our argument within the context of a credit market with adverse selection.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (1999) show that in a multi-period model in which incumbents are
exogenously given and in which only the incumbent banks know their borrowers’ char-
acteristics, it may be hard or even impossible for other banks to enter. In contrast, when
banks must compete for an incumbency position, we ﬁnd that they strategically write a
1binding agreement disclosing information about their borrowers’ ﬁrst-period project out-
comes. Such an agreement clearly lowers future barriers to entry and enables rival banks
to proﬁtably enter the incumbent’s second-period market. Thus, information disclosure
rules out entry deterrence or blockaded entry and guarantees proﬁtable entry. Clearly,
information disclosure creates second-period competition. However, it relaxes ﬁrst-period
competition for borrowers by more than the increase in second-period competition. The
intuition is that banks anticipate proﬁts from entering in the second period even when
not serving borrowers in the ﬁrst period. As a result, banks have less incentives to win
ﬁrst-period competition and to become the incumbent bank in the second period.
Although we develop our analysis for credit markets, our setting yields a much more
general insight. When ﬁrms compete for new customers, they may strategically commit
to lower future entry barriers. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their future
market. Lowering future barriers to entry increases an entrant’s second-period proﬁts
dampening ﬁrst-period competition for serving the market. Inviting entry improves the
rival’s outside option and guarantees future proﬁts to be reaped from the incumbent’s
market. This relaxes ﬁrst-period competition as the incumbent ﬁrm anticipates its cur-
rent customers may switch in the future to its rival. For example, when switching costs
are suﬃciently heterogeneous, it is proﬁt maximizing for employers to allow a rival em-
ployer for some future labor poaching. By facilitating future poaching, employers will
compete less ﬁercely today for fresh labor. Facilitation can, for example, take the form
of veriﬁable publication of an employee’s professional achievements.1
This paper also explains the incentives for borrower information disclosure towards
rival banks and its strategic eﬀects on the dynamics of banking competition. Finan-
cial market participants put forward that banking competition and ﬁnancial integration
should go hand in hand. In this perspective, the European Commission monitors the pro-
cess of ﬁnancial and banking market integration (see e.g. Danthine et al. (2001)). The
Riegle-Neal act in the US introducing the possibility of interstate branching also aims to
stimulate ﬁnancial integration. In general, markets are said to be integrated when the
law of one price holds. Complementary measures of ﬁnancial integration are based on
“broad market characteristics, ” e.g. the cross-border penetration of commercial banks
1Rønde (2001) investigates the role of information sharing in a labor market context with an exogenous
incumbent-entrant set-up.
2and other ﬁnancial institutions (Pagano (2002)). Financial and banking markets are in-
tegrated when “suﬃcient” cross-border entry and cross-border activities occur. We argue
that communication of borrower information between banks indeed enhances integration
through entry and switching of bank-ﬁrm relationships. This, however, comes at the cost
of decreased banking competition. Interestingly, ﬁnancial integration as measured by the
possibility to enter each other’s market may therefore dampen overall competition in a
dynamic context.
Lenders do communicate credit information to each other about businesses and house-
holds. This exchange of information can be informal or formal. Jappelli and Pagano
(2000) and Kallberg and Udell (2001) provide a detailed overview of the information
exchange mechanisms. The communication is informal when one lender contacts another
lender to know more about the status of a borrower. Formal exchange of information may
be regulated or voluntary. It takes the form of “public credit registers” when regulated
and organized by central banks. Voluntary exchange of information occurs through pri-
vate “credit bureaus” or private information brokers as Dun & Bradstreet corporation.2
Formal exchange of information often takes place even though the size of the partners is
highly asymmetric. For example, both large and small banks participate in information
exchange agreements. As a consequence, some members beneﬁt more from the informa-
tion exchange than others. Our paper shows that voluntary information disclosure arises
independent of potential reciprocity in receiving information from a rival bank. Thus,
banks may spontaneously provide information for strategic reasons as increasing a rival’s
second-period proﬁts lowers overall competition.
Our model includes some stylized facts of banking competition. Banks enjoy some
market power in retail and corporate banking (see Vives (2001)). Sources of market fric-
tions may stem from switching costs in retail banking and established relationships and
asymmetric information in corporate banking. Switching costs relax competition once
borrowers have established a relation. From an ex-ante point of view, however, banks
may compete harshly to establish a relationship with their borrowers.3 The resulting
“informational” hold up problem in bank-borrower relationships has been analyzed in
2Kallberg and Udell (2001) investigate the viability and added value of private information brokers.
Their empirical work, based on credit data produced by Dun&Bradstreet, shows that information sharing
adds value in solving problems with borrower informational opacity.
3Klemperer (1995) provides a nice overview of the implications and importance of switching costs.
3dynamic settings (see e.g. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)). Banks set up customer
relationships with their borrowers. The implications are that borrowers pay above actu-
arially fair interest rates once they are locked-in into a multi-period relationship, as they
cannot signal their high quality level to outside banks. These “higher” interest rates are
however entirely competed away by “lower” interest rates in the ﬁrst period of the game.
Our paper investigates the interaction between both types of credit market frictions. We
show that banks commit to strategies that discipline the informational hold-up problem
but add a switching cost lock-in problem. The disciplining of the informational hold-up
realizes through committing to provide information about borrowers. This action invites
competition by a rival bank when borrowers are old. With suﬃcient heterogeneity in
switching costs among borrowers, it is not optimal for a bank to deter entry and serve all
of its high-ability borrowers. Therefore, the informational hold-up problem is replaced
by a switching cost hold-up problem. The diﬀerence in our model, however, is that the
informational hold-up is entirely competed away in the ﬁrst period whereas this is not
t h ec a s ef o rs w i t c h i n gc o s t s .
Information disclosure or information sharing may severely impact strategic behav-
ior. Although a bank loses part of its informational rents on its local customer base,
banks may reduce adverse selection by voluntarily providing information on “migrants”
moving from one area to another (Pagano and Jappelli (1993)). In an adverse selection
model with exogenously given incumbency, Bouckaert and Degryse (2001)4 show that
incumbent banks may reduce the scope of entry by strategically disclosing information
about defaulters. The current paper shows that when the incumbency and entry status
are endogenously determined, information disclosure about all borrowers relaxes compe-
tition. Disclosure of information increases proﬁts from entering in the second period. As
a result, banks compete less vigorously to win ﬁrst-period borrowers and to become the
incumbent bank in the second period. In a model with moral hazard, Padilla and Pagano
(1997, 2000) show that committing to share information may serve as a borrower disci-
pline device. Information sharing increases competition but stimulates entrepreneurial
incentives. Our paper also shows that second-period competition increases. In contrast,
information disclosure relaxes overall competition: being second-period entrant becomes
more attractive. Gehrig and Stenbacka (2001) show that in a model in which entry is
4A previous version appeared as CEPR Discussion Paper N◦2936 and CSEF Discussion Paper N◦ 79.
4unproﬁtable, information sharing relaxes competition. Our results show that competition
is softened by inviting entry and increasing the entrant’s proﬁtability.
This paper is also related to the literature on switching costs. Typically, this liter-
ature assumes homogenous switching costs (for an overview, see Klemperer (1995)). In
addition, current market shares of ﬁrms are taken as given or it is assumed that one
ﬁrm has already an incumbency position (Klemperer (1987). Typically, when ﬁrms can
price discriminate between young and old customers, no equilibrium switching occurs.
We depart in two ways from this set up. First, we introduce suﬃcient heterogeneity in
switching costs. When consumers have suﬃciently dispersed switching costs, entry may
result. Consequently, switching may occur in equilibrium. Second, ﬁrms will ﬁght for an
incumbency or entrant position.
Our model starts from a homogenous market in the ﬁrst period and introduces fric-
tions in the second period stemming from switching costs. In our model, equilibrium
switching of a fraction of the borrowers takes place when entry occurs. An incumbent
prefers to milk its ﬁrst-period customers with high switching costs to setting a limit price
that keeps the entrant out of its market. The incumbent’s “entry-inviting” pricing behav-
ior relaxes overall competition. Therefore, our model conﬁrms the result that switching
costs lower competition even when taking into account ex-ante competition.
Our set-up is also related to Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). They analyze the issue
of customer poaching and brand switching in a two-period Hotelling model. Our results
corroborate theirs in that “inviting entry for the marginal ﬁrst-period customer” may
lower ﬁrst-period competition. In contrast, our model starts from homogeneous goods in
the ﬁrst period and addresses a commitment device that relaxes overall competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Sections 3 and 4 develops the ﬁrst-period and second-period competition analysis. Section
5o ﬀers the main results of our paper by addressing the issue of endogeneous information
display. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our set up. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a market of mass one in which borrowers are active for two subsequent periods.
Borrowers discount the future at rate 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. In every period, each borrower wants to
5invest in a one-period project requiring one unit of capital. They have no initial wealth
but can choose to borrow from bank i with i = A or B. Credit applications with several
banks within the same period are too costly for borrowers. This assumption prevents
borrowers from applying with two banks per period.
Establishing a relationship with a particular bank implies a once and for all speciﬁc
cost s for every borrower.5 We assume that s ∈ [s,s] is uniformly distributed among
borrowers. In other words, borrowers incur no additional relationship costs when they
remain with their ﬁrst-period bank i in the second period. In contrast, ﬁrst-period
borrowers must duplicate the relationship cost s in the action of switching to another
bank j 6= i in the second period. In what follows we restrict the parameters of the
model to satisfy the assumptions so that 0 ≤ 2s < s. That is, borrowers are suﬃciently
heterogeneous with respect to switching costs. It allows for entry in period two in a
market when asymmetric information is not too harsh.6 Moreover, all borrowers have
positive switching costs. Borrowers do not know the level of the switching cost s nor
their type until after the ﬁrst period. In other words, they learn their switching cost and
their type through undertaking a project. The switching cost of all borrowers is assumed
to be constant over time.
Borrowers are risk neutral and have the same expectations about their actual switch-
ing costs. Borrowers are of high ability with probability 0 <µ≤ 1.I nt h i se v e n t ,
borrowers execute projects that succeed with probability 1 and return q.W e a s s u m e
that q is large enough so that in equilibrium, when the borrowers’ type is known, a bank
wants to serve all high-ability credit applicants and every borrower wants to apply for
credit. With the remaining probability 1 − µ, borrowers have low ability and execute
projects unsuccessfully with certainty.7 Put diﬀerently, low-ability borrowers always de-
5Nilssen (1992) distinguishes between “transaction” and “learning” switching costs. Transaction
switching costs are incurred by the consumer at every switch between suppliers. Learning switching
costs are incurred only when the consumer switches to a supplier not yet visited. In our model, we have
learning switching costs in mind (see Section 5).
6This assumption guarantees an equilibrium in pure strategies (see Bester, 1992). In contrast, when
0 ≤ s ≤ 2s we could as well assume a constant switching cost s for all borrowers. This alternative
assumption would, however, no longer produce entry in the second period as it would always be optimal
for the incumbent to deter entry. See Section 6.
7Alternatively, low ability borrowers cannot identify successful projects. Or, they never execute a
project since they have such a large marginal disutility of eﬀort (see Padilla and Pagano (2000)). Our
main results are not qualitatively aﬀected as long as the expected return on low ability borrowers is
negative.
6fault, are insensitive with respect to the interest rates, and only maximize their private
beneﬁts. They apply for credit whenever possible since they enjoy non-pecuniary private
beneﬁts b ≥ 0 (net of expected switching costs) from having access to a credit line. The
private beneﬁts are limited such that b is smaller than the bank’s cost of attracting one
unit of deposits R0. That is, low-ability borrowers execute projects with a negative net
present (social) value. The proportion of high-ability and low-ability borrowers in the
population is common knowledge. The borrowers learn their type (high or low ability and
s) only after having executed a project. Once learned, both types of borrowers always
behave according to their type.
Banks compete in loan rates during both periods. Their cost of funding per project
equals R0 ≥ 1. Banks also discount the future at rate 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. They have no infor-
mation about the borrowers’ preferences and characteristics at the beginning of the ﬁrst
period.8 As in Sharpe (1990) and von Thadden (2001) we make the following simpliﬁ-
cations to concentrate on the role of asymmetric information in credit markets. Each
borrower consumes the revenues of his successful projects at the end of every period.9
Consequently, every borrower’s initial wealth is zero at the beginning of every period.
Banks sell one-period contracts and do not oﬀer long-term contracts.
When borrowers are indiﬀerent in the ﬁrst period between the two banks, we assume
that a proportion 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1 chooses bank A. The remaining proportion 1−σ patronizes
bank B. This assumption guarantees that when borrowers are indiﬀerent between the
two banks in period one, the proportion of the two borrower types is identical in each
bank’s portfolio.10
E v e r yb a n ke n j o y sa nincumbency advantage in the second period from serving cus-
tomers on its ﬁrst-period market. This advantage stems from a bank’s private observation
whether its borrowers executed a project successfully or not at the end of the ﬁrst pe-
riod. This assumption captures the notion of “relationship banking” (Rajan (1992)).
Given our assumptions, the observation of project outcomes reveals to the inside bank
8We assume that borrowers know their own type and switching cost as from period one but rule out
that banks observe their borrowers’ switching costs.
9Alternatively, the remaining output of a successful project cannot be stored (see Padilla and Pagano
(2000)).
10Suppose borrowers would know their type at t =0 . The assumption that a proportion σ of both
types would patronize bank A implies that the proportion of the two borrower types is identical in each
bank’s portfolio.
7the borrowers’ types: high or low ability. In the remainder of the paper, we will therefore,
interchangeably use project outcomes or borrower types. We make the assumption that
banks cannot observe borrowers’ switching costs.
Prior to ﬁrst-period competition, every bank makes a binding and enforceable agree-
ment to reveal its private information to its rival bank or not.11 Thus, banks commit
before competing whether to disclose private information or not. In addition, we as-
sume that if information about project outcomes is publicly disclosed, it is veriﬁable.
This assumption guarantees truthful revelation of information. Given the information
disclosure setting committed to at t =0 , banks compete at t =1for borrowers by setting
interest rates. Banks disclose the information as announced at t =0after borrowers have
executed their projects. At t =2 , a bank decides about entering its rival’s market and
“poaching” the incumbent’s ﬁrst-period borrowers. It can price discriminate between its
previous borrowers and new borrowers.12
The timing of the game is as follows and its main components are illustrated in Figure
1. Banks decide on information disclosure or not at t =0 .A tt =1 ,t h e ysimultaneously
decide on interest rates. Borrowers are not aware of their type and relationship cost s,
choose the bank that maximizes their expected utility, and execute their project. At the
end of this period, every bank observes its borrowers’ project outcomes and borrowers
learn their type and switching cost. At the start of t =2 , banks disclose information as
agreed upon at time 0. Every bank decides whether to enter or not the rival’s ﬁrst-period
market. Banks simultaneously set interest rates if entry takes place. Finally, project
outcomes are realized.
We solve this game by backward induction. Therefore, Section 3 analyzes banking
competition in the second period. We turn to the ﬁrst period in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 focuses on the equilibrium degree of information disclosure.
3 Second-period banking competition
Assume that bank A’s market share from ﬁrst-period competition equals k and bank B’s
1 − k. Our assumptions ensure an equal fraction of low-ability entrepreneurs in both
11An alternative is to provide the borrower with a certiﬁcate revealing his project outcome.
12It can be shown that a bank optimally does so, since borrowers are suﬃciently heterogeneous with
regard to switching costs when patronizing another bank.
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Figure 1: The timing of the game.
ﬁrst-period markets. Consequently, market share k or 1−k does not determine the entry
decision. Moreover, at the end of t =1 , borrowers know their type and switching cost.
For convenience, we will analyze the market from A’s point of view and assume that
k =1 . In other words, bank A is the incumbent bank (I) and bank B the entering bank
(E). Multiplying the proﬁts by k and 1 − k respectively and adapting the incumbency
(I)a n de n t r a n t( E)s t a t u sp r o v i d e su sw i t ht o t a ls e c o n d - p e r i o dp r o ﬁts given ﬁrst-period




low-ability borrowers in I’s ﬁrst-period market will not obtain a loan as their type is
revealed to both banks. Bank E however can induce bank I’s high-ability borrowers to
switch by providing lower interest rates than bank I. A high-ability borrower in the
s e c o n dp e r i o di si n d i ﬀerent between continuing her relationship at bank I and switching







The superscript 2 refers to the second period and the subscript d to information disclosure.
Borrowers with a switching cost exceeding s∗ continue their relationship with bank A.
In contrast, borrowers with a switching cost lower than s∗ patronize bank E.B a n kI’s
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The ﬁr s tp a r to fE q . ( 1 )s h o w st h a tf o rh i g he n o u g hR2I
d , I does not keep any of its
ﬁrst-period high-ability borrowers. Part two reveals that for intermediate values of bank
I’s interest rate, some of the high-ability borrowers switch bank whereas others continue
their relationship in the second period. Finally, part three presents that when R2I
d is
suﬃciently low, bank E does not poach high-ability borrowers.
3.1.2 Best-response analysis
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Notice that our assumption 2s < s ensures that both banks enjoy a positive market share
and are able to set an interest rate above the actuarially fair interest rate R0.T h e r e f o r e ,
with information disclosure entry always occurs. The intuition for this result is as follows.
The entering bank is able to deny credit to low-ability entrepreneurs since information
is disclosed. Moreover, proﬁtable entry takes place as the incumbent bank refrains from
pricing too aggressively: some borrowers have a high second-period preference for the
incumbent bank due to their relatively high switching costs.
3.2 No Information disclosure
With no information disclosure, we have to distinguish the case in which bank E com-
mitted to enter bank I’s market or not. Recall that the entry decision does not hinge on
market share k since the quality of the pool of borrowers in both ﬁrst-period markets is
identical. Moreover, the entry decision takes place before interest rates are set. Without
loss of generality, we assume again that bank I attracted the entire market in the ﬁrst
period.
The analysis with entry is similar to the information disclosure setting except that























− (1 − µ)R0 (10)
where the subscript n stands for no information disclosure. Absence of information
disclosure with entry implies that low-ability borrowers are able to obtain a loan at the
entering bank. This can readily be seen from the second component of Π2E
n .B a n k E




9R0(s − s)+( s − 2s)2. (11)
The fraction µ∗ follows from Π2E
n =0 .
Absent entry,b a n kI obtains a monopoly and charges q.B a n k I’s second-period
proﬁts then become µ(q − R0) whereas E obtains no proﬁts.
Thus, second-period entry happens when adverse selection is not too harsh µ ≥ µ∗.
Otherwise bank E does not enter, leaving bank I a monopoly.
4 First-period Banking Competition
In this section, we characterize the outcome of the banking competition subgame under
alternative information disclosure situations. We endogenize the information disclosure
choice in the next section. Three possible cases have to be distinguished. The ﬁrst is
where both banks disclose information. The second is where both banks decided not
to disclose information about project outcomes. Finally, only one bank, say bank A,
discloses information. We call this “asymmetric” disclosure of information decision.
4.1 Interest rates with information disclosure
With information disclosure, banks correctly anticipate entry into each other’s ﬁrst-period
market. They can price discriminate between “old” borrowers remaining with their ﬁrst-
period bank and “new” borrowers in their entering market. This diﬀerence in interest
rates is only driven by switching costs and not by informational diﬀerences between
banks about borrowers. As shown in the previous section, the incumbent bank enjoys
some market power over its ﬁrst-period borrowers as they face switching costs in the
action of visiting another bank. Thus, there is a hold-up problem in the second period
12stemming from switching costs and not from informational asymmetries. This subsection
analyzes how this hold-up problem impacts on competition in the ﬁrst period.
Denote by k and 1 − k t h em a r k e ts h a r eb a n kA and B obtain in the ﬁrst period,
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where the subscript d refers to disclose of information. The total proﬁt for bank A as
af u n c t i o no fi t sﬁrst-period interest rate R1

























The ﬁrst part of Eq. (12) applies when bank A sets a lower rate than its rival. Then it
attracts the entire ﬁrst-period market and is the incumbent in the second period. Part
two applies when both banks announce the same interest rate. A fraction σ borrows from
bank A. Therefore, bank A wins for that fraction σ ﬁrst-period competition and is the
incumbent bank in the second period. For the complement 1−σ,b a n kA is entrant in he
second period. Finally, part three presents the proﬁts of losing ﬁrst-period competition
and being entrant in the second period. This happens when bank A announces a higher
ﬁrst-period interest rate than its rival. A pure strategy equilibrium in which borrowers
are indiﬀerent in the ﬁrst period will imply that k = σ. The results for the ﬁrst-period
competition with information disclosure are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 With information disclosure, there is a unique Nash-equilibrium in period-













ΠAd = ΠBd = δΠ
2E
d . (14)
Pr o o f . Suppose a bank charges a higher ﬁrst-period interest rate than its rival.
Then, it attracts no borrowers in the ﬁrst period and becomes the entrant in the second
period. In this event, its discounted total proﬁts equal δΠ2E
d . From Eq. (8) a bank
13prefers to be the incumbent as this yields second-period proﬁts Π2I
d > Π2E
d .T h e r e f o r e ,
a bank is willing to undercut its rival even below R0. Perfect competition in the ﬁrst
period ensures that the diﬀerence between the incumbent’s and entrant’s proﬁts are
competed away such that future gains are traded for current ﬁrst-period losses. Since
δ(Π2I
d − Π2E












imply a ﬁrst-period proﬁto fσ(µ[R0/µ − δ(s + s)/3] − R0) and a second-period proﬁt
of δ[σΠ2I
d +(1−σ)Π2E
d ] for bank A.A d d i n gu pb o t hp r o ﬁts yields an overall discounted
proﬁte q u a lt oδΠ2E
d for both banks. Let us analyze bank A’s ﬁrst-period price setting
behavior given R1
Bd = R0/µ − δ(s + s)/3. Suppose bank A decides to decrease its
interest rate with ε>0 below R1
Bd.T h e n A attracts the entire market in the ﬁrst
period and becomes the only incumbent in the second period. Its total proﬁts now equal
−δ(µ(s + s)/3) −  µ + δΠ2I
d <δ Π2E
d . Suppose bank A decides to set a higher interest
rate than its rival bank B. This implies that bank A attracts no borrowers in the ﬁrst
period. It therefore becomes the entrant in the second period and its total proﬁts become
δΠ2E
d . Therefore, bank A’s proﬁts do not strictly increase by increasing its interest rate.
A similar analysis applies for bank B. Any other combination of interest rates will
lead to proﬁtable deviation for one or the other bank. This completes the proof of the
proposition.
In conclusion, with information disclosure, banks incur ﬁrst-period losses on their
customer base. The losses on these borrowers are equal to the discounted diﬀerence

















The ﬁrst-period equilibrium interest rates are below the actuarially fair rates R0/µ.T h i s
result has to be entirely attributed to the switching cost hold-up problem and not to in-
formational diﬀerences. The losses on ﬁrst-period borrowers are recouped from additional
proﬁts in the second period: the switching cost hold-up allows an incumbent to charge
a higher interest rate compared to an entrant. Thus, competition for serving the market
in the ﬁrst period ensures that the expected diﬀerence in hold-up rents are given back
14upfront to the borrowers. Remark that banks do not compete all rents away over the two
periods. The presence of information makes second-period entry proﬁtable independent
of the degree of asymmetric information. This relaxes overall competition. Furthermore,
a bank can avoid low-ability borrowers by not pricing too aggressively in the ﬁrst period:
letting the rival bank win ﬁrst-period competition reveals the low-ability types. Since
we assumed that the proportion of the two borrower types is identical in each bank’s
portfolio, our results are independent of σ. Finally, there is “rent equalization” in that
both banks enjoy identical proﬁts.
4.2 Interest rates without information disclosure
Banks only enter each other’s ﬁrst-period market when µ ≥ µ∗. Otherwise, banks obtain
a monopoly in the second period.
4.2.1 With second-period entry: µ ≥ µ∗
Denote by k (1−k) the market share that bank A (B) obtained in the ﬁrst period. Bank





n +( 1− k)Π
2E
n (17)
where the subscript n refers to no information.
The total proﬁt for bank A as a function of its ﬁrst-period interest rate R1
An and the
























A pure strategy equilibrium in which borrowers are indiﬀerent in the ﬁrst period will
imply that k = σ. The results for the ﬁrst-period competition with information disclosure
are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Without information disclosure and with second-period entry (µ ≥ µ∗),
















ΠAn = ΠBn = δΠ
2E
n . (20)
Pr o o f .Suppose a bank charges a higher ﬁrst-period interest rate than its rival. Then,
it attracts no borrowers in the ﬁrst period and becomes the entrant in the second period.
In this event, its discounted total proﬁts equal δΠ2E
n . From Eq. (10) a bank prefers to be
the incumbent as this yields second-period proﬁts Π2I
n > Π2E
n . Therefore, a bank is willing
to undercut its rival. Perfect competition in the ﬁrst period ensures that the diﬀerence
between the incumbent’s and entrant’s proﬁts are competed away such that future gains
are traded for current ﬁrst-period losses. Since δ(Π2I
n −Π2E
n )=δ[µ(s + s)/3+(1−µ)R0],















imply a ﬁrst-period proﬁto fσ(µ[R0/µ−δ((s + s)/3]+(1−µ)R0/µ]−R0) and a second-
period proﬁto fδ[σΠ2I
n +(1−σ)Π2E
n ] for bank A. Adding up both proﬁts yields an overall
discounted proﬁte q u a lt oδΠ2E
n for both banks. Let us analyze bank A’s ﬁrst-period
price setting behavior given R1
Bn = R0/µ − δ(s + s)/3 − δ(1 − µ)R0/µ. Suppose bank
A decides to decrease its interest rate by ε>0 below R1
Bn.T h e nA attracts the entire
market in the ﬁrst period and becomes the only incumbent in the second period. Its
total proﬁts now equal −δ(µ(s + s)/3+( 1− µ)R0) − µ +δΠ2I
n <δ Π2E
n . Suppose bank
A charges an interest rate exceeding R1
Bn.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,b a n kA attracts no borrowers
in the ﬁrst period. It therefore becomes the entrant in the second period and its total
discounted proﬁts become δΠ2E
n .T h e r e f o r e ,b a n kA’s proﬁts do not increase by charging
the higher interest rate. A similar analysis applies for bank B. Any other combination of
interest rates will lead to proﬁtable deviation for one or the other bank. This completes
the proof of the proposition.
Proposition 2 shows that ﬁrst-period loan rates are far below the actuarially fair rates.
This result stems from both informational diﬀerences and switching costs. Again, without
information disclosure and with second-period entry, banks prefer to be incumbent in the
second period to entrant. The intuition is even stronger than in the case with information
disclosure. This can be seen from comparing Eqs. (8) and (10). In other words, second-
period entry is not such an attractive option anymore: banks cannot single out unknown
16low-ability borrowers in the second period. Being incumbent is the only way to ensure
large proﬁts in the second period. Consequently, ﬁrst-period competition is relatively
harsh and overall proﬁts are lower compared to information disclosure. The ﬁrst-period



















Thus, the absence of information harshens competition over the two periods since second-
period entry is less attractive. high-ability borrowers beneﬁt from the absence of infor-
mation disclosure as overall competition is harsh. low-ability borrowers beneﬁta sw e l l
since an entering bank cannot distinguish borrowers’ types. As in Proposition 1, our
results are independent of σ since the proportion of the two borrower types is identical in
each bank’s portfolio. Similarly, “rent equalization” follows as both banks enjoy identical
proﬁts.
4.2.2 Without second-period entry: µ<µ ∗
No entry takes place in the absence of information and when adverse selection is too
harsh (µ<µ ∗). Then a bank obtains a monopoly on its ﬁrst-period customers. However,
ab a n ko n l yb e n e ﬁts from this monopoly situation when it attracts borrowers in the ﬁrst
period. In other words, following the strategy of not attracting customers in the ﬁrst
period leaves you with zero proﬁts in the second period. Second-period proﬁts when
incumbent (k =1 )i nt h eﬁrst period become
Π
2I
n = µ[q − R0]. (23)
Otherwise, second-period proﬁts are zero. The total proﬁt for bank A as a function of
its ﬁrst-period interest rate R1






















A pure strategy equilibrium in which borrowers are indiﬀerent in the ﬁrst period will
imply that k = σ. The results for the ﬁrst-period competition with information disclosure
17are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Without information display and absent second-period entry (µ<µ ∗),








− δ(q − R0). (25)
Total proﬁts become
ΠAn = ΠBn =0 . (26)
Pr o o f .The proof is similar to Propositions 1 and 2.
First period interest rates are far below the actuarially fair rates R0/µ. This result is
entirely driven by informational lock-in. Without second-period entry, only the incum-
bent bank realizes proﬁts in the second period. Therefore, a bank has hughe incentives to
win ﬁrst-period competition. Consequently, ﬁrst-period competition is harsh and banks
oﬀer a serious discount to borrowers in the ﬁrst period anticipating that borrowers will
be informationally locked-in tomorrow. Overall proﬁts are equal to zero. high-ability
borrowers pay high interest rates in the second period: they are informationally locked-
in. Ex ante however, the informational lock-in problem is unimportant. The intuition is
that the informational lock-in is competed entirely away in the ﬁrst period. This shows
up since overall proﬁts are equal to zero. The switching cost hold-up problem is absent
s i n c en oe n t r yt a k e sp l a c e .
4.3 Interest rates with “asymmetric” disclosure of information
decision
In this subgame we discuss the case in which only one bank discloses information. For
convenience suppose only bank A discloses information. We distinguish between two
cases where bank A enters B’s market (µ ≥ µ∗) and where there is no entry (µ<µ ∗).
Since bank A discloses information, bank B will always enter A’s market.
4.3.1 With entry into the market without information
Borrowers correctly anticipate second-period interest rates as well as entry by A into B’s





B − δ(1 − µ)b.
Thus, borrowers have an extra willingness to pay for bank B not disclosing information.
The intuition is when bank A enters B’s market, it will grant low-ability borrowers a
loan in the second period. In other words, since A enters B’s market, choosing the bank
not disclosing information ensures borrowers access to their private beneﬁts if they turn
out to be a low-ability type. Expected switching costs do not inﬂuence the marginal
borrower as entry is expected to take place in both ﬁrst-period markets.
The next Proposition presents the main insights.
Proposition 4 When only bank A commits to display information and second-period
entry takes place in both markets (µ ≥ µ∗), there is a unique Nash-equilibrium in period-






















Bank A attracts all ﬁrst-period borrowers (k =1 ). Banks’ total proﬁts become
ΠA = δΠ
2E






Pr o o f . From Eq. (8) the discounted diﬀerence in proﬁtability between being
incumbent and entrant in the second period for bank B equals (s + s)/3 per high-
ability borrower. Therefore, bank B’s ﬁrst-period interest rate will not be lower than
R0/µ − δ(s + s)/3.O t h e r w i s e ,b a n k B can better price such that A obtains the ﬁrst-
period market. Similarly, from Eq. (10) bank A will not price lower than R0/µ −
δ(s + s)/3−δ(1 − µ)R0/µ. Otherwise, bank A is better oﬀ being entrant in the second
period. Since b<R 0 implies that borrowers’ extra willingness to pay for bank B is
smaller than its cost of funding. Therefore bank A does not need to price too aggres-
sively to keep bank B out of its ﬁrst-period market. Let us analyze bank A’s price setting
behavior given R1
B = R0/µ−δ(s + s)/3.B a n kA has no incentive to set its interest rate
below R1
A = R0/µ−δ(s + s)/3−δ(1 − b)/µ −ε.G i v e nR1
B, this is the highest interest
19rate at which bank A attracts the entire ﬁrst-period market. An increase in its interest
rate implies leaving (part of) the ﬁrst-period market to B. This action again lowers A’s
proﬁts. Bank B has no incentives to lower its interest rate below R1
B = R0/µ−δ(s + s)/3
given R1
A = R0/µ − δ(s + s)/3 − δ(1 − µ)b/µ − ε. Increasing its interest rate does not
aﬀect B’s proﬁts. Any other combination of interest rates leads to proﬁtable deviation
by one or the other bank. Total bank proﬁts become
ΠA = δΠ
2E






This completes the proof of the proposition.
Bank B attracts no ﬁrst-period borrowers although they have a higher ﬁrst-period
willingness to pay. However, the extra willingness to pay for a bank not disclosing
information is lower than the cost of funds as b<R 0. The intuition is that bank A is
better of undercutting bank B in the ﬁrst-period since the private beneﬁts are relatively
low. This implies that A becomes the incumbent and enjoys the incumbency proﬁts in
the second period. Thus, information for the entire market is disclosed at the end of the
ﬁrst period although one of the banks commits not to disclose information.
4.3.2 No entry into the market without information
Borrowers correctly anticipate second-period interest rates as well as no entry by A into





A +( 1− α)(R
2E
B + E(s | s<s
∗)) = µR
1
B + δµq (33)
with α ≡ (¯ s−s∗)/(¯ s−s) the probability with which a borrower will have a switching cost
s ≥ s∗.T h eﬁrst term in the left-hand side of Eq. (33) shows the expected ﬁrst-period
cost of borrowing from bank A. The second term reﬂects the discounted expected cost
in the second period. In the event the borrower has high switching costs s∗ ≤ s,h ew i l l
continue borrowing from his ﬁrst-period bank A. In the event the borrower has a low
switching cost s<s ∗, he will actually switch to bank B. The right-hand side shows the
expected cost of borrowing from bank B in the both periods. It clearly illustrates the
“bargain-then-ripoﬀ” pricing pattern of bank B.
20Thus, borrowers have an extra willingness to pay for the bank disclosing information.
The intuition comes in two steps. First, low-ability borrowers do not have access to a loan
whatever the choice of bank since no entry is expected in the market absent information.
Second, entry is expected in A’s ﬁrst-period market whereas borrowers are locked in when
choosing for B. The reason is that A discloses information and A does not enter B’s
ﬁrst-period market.
Proposition 5 When only bank A commits to display information and no second-period
entry takes place in the market absent information (µ<µ ∗) ,t h e r ei sau n i q u eN a s h -































Pr o o f .Bank B will not price lower than R0/µ − δ[q − R0]+δ(s − 2s)2/9(s − s).
The reason is that by becoming incumbent the additional proﬁts he makes compared
to being entrant are δ
£
µ[q − R0] − Π2E
d
¤
= δ[µ[q − R0] − µ(s − 2s)2/9(s − s)].B a n kA
cannot guarantee itself a positive proﬁt since it is optimal not to enter B’s market in the
second period. Therefore, it will not price lower in the ﬁrst period than R0/µ − Π2I
d =
R0/µ − δ[(2s − s)2/9(s − s)]. That is, bank A is willing to price up to the point where
it loses up front the second-period incumbency proﬁts. However, A can drive B out
of the ﬁrst-period market and still make positive proﬁts. The intuition is that it oﬀers
its ﬁrst-period borrowers the option to switch to bank B in the second period in the
event the borrowers’ switching costs are low. Bank B w i l ln o tu n d e r c u tb a n kA’s oﬀer
s i n c et h i sw o u l dy i e l dl o w e rp r o ﬁts than entering in the second period. Remark that
R1










21Remark that A’s proﬁts are higher than when entering a market with information.
Bank A obtains a positive proﬁt since bank B does not want to price too aggressively and
borrowers have a higher willingness to pay for bank A. The expected cost of switching
equals E(s | s<s ∗)=( ¯ s +4 s)/6 since when k =1 ,w eh a v et h a tα =( 2 ¯ s − s)/3(¯ s − s).
5 Equilibrium information disclosure
In this section, we endogenize information disclosure decisions taken by banks. Our
results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Incumbent banks strategically lower future barriers to entry by commiting
to disclose information about their borrowers’ characteristics.
The proof of the proposition is contained in the discussion below.
5.1 Low asymmetric information
Consider ﬁrst the case where adverse selection is low, or µ ≥ µ∗. Figure 2 summarizes
the relevant bank payoﬀs. When both banks disclose their information (I,I), their prof-
its amount to δΠ2E
d as shown in Proposition 1. Without information disclosure (N,N)
both banks earn δΠ2E
n as shown in Proposition 2. Finally, Proposition 4 presents the
results when only one bank discloses its information (I,N or N,I). Proﬁts amount to
δΠ2E
d − (1 − µ)b for the bank disclosing information while the bank not disclosing infor-
mation receives a payoﬀ equal to δΠ2E
d . Information disclosure is weakly dominant for
both players.13 Both banks are better oﬀ committing to provide information. Disclosing
information is a weakly dominant strategy: whatever the strategy of the rival bank, a
bank is never worse oﬀ providing information. This happens since b<R 0. The unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium then becomes (I,I). Thus, banks relax competition
by providing information. Entry would take place independent of information. Provid-
ing information to the competitor improves the competitor’s outside option and clearly
relaxes competition.
13Information disclosure is strictly dominant when the cost of accessing the information is larger than
























Figure 2: Proﬁts with and without information disclosure when µ ≥ µ∗.
5.2 Substantial asymmetric information
We analyze the case where a priori asymmetric information is substantial (µ<µ ∗). The
relevant payoﬀs are summarized in Figure 3.
It is a weakly dominant strategy for every bank to provide information. The reason
is that proﬁts become zero in case banks do not oﬀer information: second-period rents
are entirely competed away in the ﬁrst period. Thus, even with substantial asymmetric
information, banks have incentives to unilaterally provide information to competitors.
This improves the outside option of the rival bank and reduces overall competition.
6D i s c u s s i o n
The model presented assumes that high-ability borrowers always execute successful projects.
Information disclosure about project outcomes or borrower types then coincide. “Partial”
information disclosure, i.e. disclosure about project outcomes only, diﬀers from disclo-
sure about borrower types when the high ability’s success probability is less than one.
With partial information disclosure, unsuccessful high-ability and low-ability borrowers
are pooled together. Our results remain robust even when banks would be able to opt
for “partial” information disclosure. Thus banks want to commit to disclose information




























Figure 3: Proﬁts with and without information disclosure when µ<µ ∗.
willingness to pay for a bank committing to disclose its type. This result stands in con-
trast to Padilla and Pagano (2001) where sharing infromation about borrower types may
reduce borrowers’ incentives to perform.
We discussed unilateral information disclosure by banks. Banks however often mu-
tually agree to exchange information, that is “share” information. Banks may de-
cide whether to share information or not before competition in the loan market takes
place. In practice, we observe voluntary and regulated information sharing among banks
through credit bureaus and private credit registers (see Jappelli and Pagano (2000) for
an overview). Our results also show that banks unilaterally commit to disclose informa-
tion independently of their market share. Thus, it is as if information sharing among
banks occurs. Actually information sharing only reinforces our results since then a bank
anticipates to receive its rival’s borrower information.
We started from suﬃcient heterogeneity in switching costs to allow for proﬁtable
entry. Even absent asymmetric information, proﬁtable second-period entry is not possible
when heterogeneity in switching costs is less substantially (2s > s). The second-period
incumbent bank would optimally set a second-period limit interest rate to retain all its
high-ability borrowers (see e.g. Padilla and Pagano (2000)). This leaves zero proﬁts for
the entrant in the second period. Then information display does not aﬀect future barriers
to entry. Banks become indiﬀerent between information disclosure or not.
Banks could consider to oﬀer type contingent long term contracts to borrowers. It
24is clear that low-ability borrowers will be denied a loan in the second period. Ex ante,
however, all or none of the borrowers would choose for the long term contract since
they have similar expectations about their switching cost. Oﬀe r i n gl o n gt e r mc o n t r a c t s
that are chosen by borrowers relaxes second-period competition as borrowers are locked
in into the long term contract (see Aghion and Bolton (1987)). However, this sharpens
ﬁrst-period competition as a bank only obtains proﬁts when it is incumbent in the second
period. Therefore, short term contracts relax overall competition and arrive endogenously
in our setting.
Our setting only considers adverse selection problems. Information disclosure may
also arise to curb moral hazard problems (see e.g. Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000)).
In that setting, banks may commit to share some information to induce borrowers to
work hard. Adding a stage in which borrowers can inﬂuence their repayment probability
may aﬀect our results. We have shown that information disclosure relaxes competition.
This introduces moral hazard problems: borrowers have less incentives to work hard.
Committing not to disclose information may then induce borrowers to work harder at
the cost of introducing harsher competition.
Borrower switching and low-ability borrowers obtaining loans drives welfare in our
model. Information disclosure minimizes loans to low-ability borrowers but induces
maximal switching. Welfare maximizing information disclosure hinges on the degree
of asymmetric information. No information disclosure is optimal with substantial asym-
metric information (µ<µ ∗). No second-period entry takes place. Therefore high-ability
borrowers do not switch and low-ability borrowers do not obtain a second-period loan.
The welfare maximizing solution endogenously arrives with low asymmetric information
(µ ≥ µ∗). Entry takes place regardless of information disclosure. low-ability borrowers
do not obtain a second-period loan with information disclosure.
Our model assumed borrowers learn their type and switching cost through lending.
An alternative assumption would be that borrowers know their type and/or switching
cost before accepting oﬀers from banks. Borrowers that are informed about their type
would not alter our results as long as they split in a similar way as high-ability borrowers
among banks. low-ability borrowers understand the objectives of high-ability borrowers:
they optimally hide behind high-ability borrowers to obtain a loan in the ﬁrst period.
Our results thus remain robust since again endogenous information disclosure reveals
25borrowers type in the second period. Borrowers may be informed before contracting
about their learning switching costs. This complicates our analysis since then borrowers
respond diﬀerently to interest rate changes depending on the magnitude of their switching
costs.
We discuss a duopoly situation but admittedly this is a simplifying assumption. In
r e a l i t yw eh a v em o r et h a nt w ob a n k sc o m p e t i n gt oa t t r a c tb o r r o w e r s .O u rr e s u l t sq u a l i t a -
tively continue to hold as long as there is some form of imperfect competition between all
other banks in the second period. This imperfect competition guarantees that committing
to information disclosure relaxes future barriers to entry without all proﬁts being com-
peted away among entrants. When entrants are perfect substitutes in the second period,
committing to disclose information does not aﬀect the proﬁts of entrants in the second
period. This would produce perfect competition and the idea of relaxing competition
through information disclosure would inevitably disappear.
Banks credibly commit to disclose information about borrowers through writing en-
forceable contracts with entrepreneurs or providing information to the rival bank. These
contracts are renegotiation proof since the entrepreneurs want to enforce the contract.
Banks however may want to revise the contract as they may want to informationally hold-
up the entrepreneur when asymmetric information is substantial. This could be captured
by breach of contract. If breach of contract is possible, borrowers would rationally fore-
see this. Therefore the borrowers’ willingness to pay for a bank committing to disclose
information would decrease. Nevertheless, borrowers still prefer a bank committing to
disclose information expecting breach of contract to one not disclosing information.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper shows that ﬁrms may soften overall competition by lowering future barriers
to entry. In this way, ﬁrms invite entry into their incumbent market relaxing ﬁrst-period
competition. We provide an application of this more general result by looking at strategic
information display in the banking industry. Bank-ﬁrm interaction provides a bank with
an informational advantage about its borrowers. In the absence of entry, borrowers
encounter an informational hold-up problem once a relationship is established. Moreover,
with entry, borrowers may face learning switching costs in the action of visiting a bank.
26An incumbent bank therefore may prefer to price not too aggressively to milk some of
its previous borrowers. Our results reveal that banks commit to provide information
to competitors and give away their informational advantage. This action occurs for
strategic reasons: providing information invites entry and augments the rival’s second-
period proﬁts. The increase in the rival’s second-period proﬁts however dampens its
incentives to win ﬁrst-period competition and lure borrowers. In sum we have shown
that information disclosure relaxes overall price competition. Our result also shows that
competition in markets with suﬃcient heterogeneity in switching costs is relaxed even
when taking into account ﬁrst-period competition.
A bank strategically curbs the informational hold-up problem by committing to dis-
close information to competitors. Information disclosure increases the borrowers’ ﬁrst-
period willingness to pay: borrowers anticipate the absence of the informational hold-up.
The informational hold-up problem is however substituted by a switching cost hold-up
problem: borrowers prefer the incumbent bank due to learning switching costs. Our
model therefore rationalizes why in so many countries communication of information
takes place.
Our results have important implications for ﬁnancial integration and competition.
This model suggests that banks may be willing to stimulate ﬁnancial integration by
committing to disclose information about borrowers. Banks may suﬀer in the short
run since they are giving away informational rents. Ex ante however, overall banking
competition may be relaxed.
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